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Abstract
Firewalls are the mainstay of enterprise security and the
most widely adopted technology for protecting private net-
works. Ensuring the correctness of ﬁrewall policies through
testing is important. In ﬁrewall policy testing, test inputs
are packets and test outputs are decisions. Packets with
unexpected (expected) evaluated decisions are classiﬁed as
failed (passed) tests. Given failed tests together with passed
tests, policy testers need to debug the policy to detect fault
locations (such as faulty rules). Such a process is often
time-consuming. To help reduce effort on detecting fault
locations, we propose an approach to reduce the number
of rules for inspection based on information collected dur-
ing evaluating failed tests. Our approach ranks the reduced
rules to decide which rules should be inspected ﬁrst. We
performed experiments on applying our approach. The em-
pirical results show that our approach can reduce 56% of
rules that are required for inspection in fault localization.
1 Introduction
Serving as the ﬁrst line of defense against malicious at-
tacks and unauthorized trafﬁc, ﬁrewalls are crucial elements
in securing the private networks of businesses, institutions,
and home networks. A ﬁrewall is typically placed at the
point-of-entry between a private network and the outside
Internet so that all network trafﬁc has to pass through the
ﬁrewall. As a ﬁrewall highly depends on the quality of
its ﬁrewall policy in terms of packet ﬁltering, ﬁrewall er-
rors are mostly caused by faults (i.e., misconﬁgurations) in
rules of ﬁrewall policies. Wool [10] studied a large number
of real-life ﬁrewalls and found that more than 90% of them
have faults in their rules.
Various ﬁrewall policy testing tools [3,5–7] have been
proposed to expose security problems of policies. In ﬁre-
wall policy testing, test inputs and outputs are packets
and their evaluated decisions (against a ﬁrewall policy un-
der test), respectively. Firewall policy testers inspect each
packet-decision pair to check whether the decision is ex-
pected. The testers classify packet-decision pairs into
passed tests and failed tests. Packets that are evaluated to
expected decisions are classiﬁed as passed tests. Packets
that are evaluated to unexpected decisions (due to faulty
rulesinapolicy) areclassiﬁed asfailedtests. Failed testsin-
dicate that the policy under test includes faults, which cause
failures.
Given failed tests together with passed tests, policy
testers often debug a ﬁrewall policy to ﬁx a fault. When
a ﬁrewall fails to ﬁlter a packet properly due to a fault in
its policy, the policy testers debug the policy — analyze
the failure, locate the fault, and ﬁx the fault. Among the
three steps, locating the fault (i.e., fault localization) re-
quires time-consuming and mostly manual inspection of the
policy to detect its fault locations (i.e., root causes) such as
rules that cause the failure. When a ﬁrewall policy may con-
sist of a nontrivial number of rules, locating faulty rules by
manual inspection is an error-prone, time-consuming, and
tedious task. Therefore, developing an effective approach
for fault localization can greatly help the policy testers re-
duce the cost of debugging.
In this paper, we focus on fault localization for a ﬁre-
wall policy including a single fault. We model two im-
portant fault types, Rule Decision Change (RDC) and Rule
Field interval Change (RFC). An RDC fault indicates in-
correct decision in a rule and an RFC fault indicates in-
correct range values in a ﬁeld (e.g., source/destination IP
addresses). When a policy includes such faults, some pack-
ets will be evaluated to incorrect decisions. Our approach
ﬁrst analyzes a faulty policy and its failed tests. The ap-
proach considers rules covered by failed tests and deter-
mines whether the covered rules include a fault such as
RDC and RFC. If the covered rules do not include a fault,
our approach suggests other likely faulty rules for inspec-
tion. To reduce effort for detecting fault locations, our ap-
proach reduces the number of rules for inspection based on
faultybehaviorscausedbyafault. Tohelpfurtherreduceef-
fort, our approach ranks the reduced rules to decide which
rules should be inspected ﬁrst based on structural coverageduring evaluation of failed tests.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents background information on ﬁrewall policies, pol-
icy model, and structural policy coverage, and packet gen-
eration. Section 3 describes a fault model for ﬁrewall poli-
cies. Section 4 describes our approach. Section 5 describes
the evaluation where we apply the approach on various ﬁre-
wall policies. Section 6 discusses related work. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Background
This section presents the background information for our
approach, including an introduction of ﬁrewall policies as
well as our previous work [3] on a ﬁrewall policy model,
structural coverage measurement, and packet generation.
2.1 Firewall Policies
A ﬁrewall policy is composed of a sequence of rules that
specify under what conditions a packet is accepted and dis-
carded while passing between a private network and the
outside Internet. In other words, the policy describes a
sequence of rules to decide whether packets are accepted
(i.e., being legitimate) or discarded (i.e., being illegitimate).
A rule is composed of a set of ﬁelds (generally includ-
ing source/destination IP addresses, source/destination port
numbers, and protocol type) and a decision. Each ﬁeld rep-
resents a set of possible values (to match the corresponding
value of a packet), which are either a single value or a ﬁnite
interval of non-negative integers.
A packet consists of values, each of which corresponds
to a ﬁeld. A packet matches a rule if and only if each value
of the packet satisﬁes the corresponding values in the rule.
Upon ﬁnding a matching rule, the corresponding decision
of that rule is derived. When evaluating a packet, a ﬁrewall
policy follows the ﬁrst-match semantic: the decision of the
ﬁrst matching rule is the decision of the packet.
Figure 1 includes an example of a ﬁrewall policy. The
symbol “*” denotes the corresponding domain range (e.g.,
0.0.0.0 - 255.255.255.255 for the IP address ﬁeld). The
example has three ﬁrewall rules r1, r2, and r3. Rule
r1 accepts any packet whose destination IP address is
192.168. ∗ .∗ (which indicates the range [192.168.0.0,
192.168.255.255]). Rule r2 discards any packet whose
source IP address is 1.2.3.∗ (which indicates the range
[1.2.3.0, 1.2.3.255]) and port is the range [1,28 − 1] with
the TCP protocol type. Rule r3 is a tautology rule to discard
all packets. Let k be a packet whose destination IP address
is 192.168.0.0 and protocol type is UDP. When evaluating
k, we ﬁnd that k can match both r1 and r3. Among the two
rules, as r1 is the ﬁrst-matching rule, k is evaluated to be
accepted (based on the decision of r1).
2.2 Firewall Policy Model
Inthispaper, weuseamodelofaﬁrewallpolicybasedon
common generic features [3]. A ﬁrewall policy is composed
of a sequence of rules, each of which has the form (called
the generic representation) as follows.
 predicate  →  decision  (1)
A  predicate  in a rule deﬁnes a set of packets over a ﬁ-
nite number of ﬁelds F1, ..., Fn. The  decision  of a rule
can be accept or discard and returned as the evaluation re-
sult when the  predicate  is evaluated to be true.
A packet k can be viewed as a tuple (fv1, ..., fvn) over
a ﬁnite number of ﬁelds F1, ..., Fn, where fvi is a variable
whose values are within a domain, denoted by D(Fi). In a
policy model, we convert values in ﬁelds to corresponding
integer values to simplify a representation format (e.g., IP
address 255.255.255.255 is 232−1). Let Si denote a subset
of domain D(Fi). The  predicate  can be represented as
(F1 ∈ S1) ∧ ... ∧ (Fn ∈ Sn) (2)
We refer to each Fi ∈ Si as a  clause , which can be either
evaluated to true or false. Note that a ﬁrewall policy fol-
lows the ﬁrst-match semantic. Given a sequence of rules,
the following process is iterated until reaching the last rule:
if a  predicate  in a rule is evaluated to true, then the cor-
responding decision is returned; otherwise, the next rule (if
exists) is evaluated.
2.3 Coverage Measurement
We have deﬁned three types of policy structural coverage
foreachofthethreemajorentitiesinaﬁrewallpolicy: rules,
predicates, and clauses [3].
• Rule coverage. A rule is covered by a packet if the rule
is the ﬁrst matching rule on the packet and the decision
of the rule is derived.
• Predicate coverage. A predicate can be evaluated to
true or false. A true (false) predicate is covered by a
packet if the predicate is evaluated to true (false).
• Clause coverage. A clause can be evaluated to true or
false. A true (false) clause is covered by a packet if the
clause is evaluated to true (false).
To automate the measurement of policy coverage, we use
a measurement tool [3] to evaluate packets against the pol-
icy under test.
2.4 Packet Generation Based on Local
Constraint Solving
In our previous work [3], we developed automated
packet generation techniques based on constraint solving.Rule Source IP Source Port Destination IP Destination Port Protocol Decision
r1 * * 192.168.*.* * * accept
r2 1.2.3.* * * [1,28 − 1] TCP discard
r3 * * * * * discard
Figure 1. An example ﬁrewall policy
Among the choices of packet generation techniques, we
observed that packets generated by solving individual rule
constraints can achieve comparable coverage with that by
solving combined constraints, but requires much lower
analysis cost. Therefore, our approach uses packet gener-
ation by solving individual rule constraints (rather than that
by solving combined constraints).
This technique statically analyzes rules to generate test
packets. Given a policy, the packet generator ﬁrst analyzes
the entities in an individual rule and generates packets to
evaluate the constraints (i.e., conditions) of the entities to be
true or false. Second, the generator constructs constraints
to evaluate each clause in a rule to be either false or true.
Finally, the generator generates a packet based on the con-
crete values derived to satisfy each constraint by constraint
solving.
3 Fault Model
This section describes potential faults in ﬁrewall poli-
cies. Assume that there is a single fault in a ﬁrewall policy.
Based on fault models [3], we focus on two types of single
faults:
• Rule Decision Change (RDC). Faults in the RDC cat-
egory indicate that Rule ri’s decision is incorrect. For
example, the policy authors assign discard instead of
accept (that is assumed correct) in ri.
• Rule Field interval Change (RFC). Faults in the RFC
category indicate that a ﬁeld interval Fi in Rule ri is
incorrect. For example, the policy authors assign “*”
instead of a speciﬁc interval [0, 50] (that is assumed
correct) in ri’s source IP address ﬁeld.
These faults describe that a ﬁrewall rule contains a single
fault in its structural entity (e.g., a decision or clause). Any
fault in a structural entity is critical for compromising the
correctness of policy behavior.
4 Fault Localization
For fault localization, we develop three techniques to re-
duce the number of rules for inspection and rank the re-
duced rules to decide which rules should be inspected ﬁrst.
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Figure 2. Example faulty policy with struc-
tural coverage and computed metrics about
its test suite, and its rules’ rank. In the pol-
icy, R4’s decision is incorrect and this faulty
rule is in bold.
4.1 Covered-Rule-Fault Localization
This section describes a technique to locate a faulty rule
when it is covered by failed tests. This technique is to de-
tect a faulty rule in a policy by suggesting the policy testers
to inspect the earliest-placed rule covered by failed tests.
If many rules rs are covered by failed tests, the earliest-
placed rule rp refers to the rule that is located above other
rules covered by failed tests and is given the highest prior-
ity among rs for inspection. This technique suggests rp as a
faulty rule for inspection; other rules in rs may be covered
(by failed tests) due to a fault in rp.
Let a policy p include a sequence of rules, r1, r2, ..., rn.
Rule ri refers to the faulty rule in p. Consider that rules ri
and rj are covered by failed tests ki and kj, respectively. If
rule ri located below rj (i > j), no matter how we change
thepredicate ordecisionofri, thefailedtestkj stillmatches
orcoversrj anditsdecisionisstillincorrect.. Therefore, the
faulty rule ri should be located above rj (i ≤ j) and should
be inspected to ﬁx. Among ri and rj, ri is the earliest-
placed rule.
Considering an example faulty ﬁrewall policy in Fig-
ure 2, the numbers in Columns 2 and 3 show the times of
each rule covered by failed and passed tests, respectively.
In this example, 10 tests are used: 8 tests are passed and 2
tests are failed. We inject an RDC fault to R4 by changing
its decision from “discard” to “accept”. According to our
technique, because R4 is the earliest-placed rule covered by
failed tests, we suggest that R4 is likely to contain a fault
for inspection.●
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Figure 3. Example faulty policy with structural coverage and computed metrics about its test suite,
and its rules’ rank. In the policy, range values in ﬁeld F3 (of rule R1) are incorrect and this faulty rule
is in bold.
4.2 Rule Reduction
If the earliest-placed rule covered by failed tests does not
include a fault, we propose two techniques to effectively
reduce the number of rules for inspection.
The ﬁrst technique is based on that a faulty rule is lo-
cated at least above or at the earliest-placed rule by failed
tests. The technique suggests rules (that are located at least
above or at the earliest-placed rule covered by failed tests)
as likely faulty rules for inspection. Let a policy p includes
a sequence of rules, r1, r2, ..., rn. Consider that ri is the
earliest-placed rule covered by failed tests during evalua-
tion of failed tests. If rule rj (j > i) is the faulty rule, ri is
given higher priority than rj during evaluation. In such a
case, no matter how we change the predicate or decision of
rj, packet ki that covers ri still has an incorrect decision.
Therefore, the faulty rule rj should be located at the same
or above ri (j ≤ i) to cause faulty policy behavior observed
during evaluation of ri.
The second technique is based on that a faulty rule’s de-
cision decj must be different from the decision deci of rules
covered by failed tests. Among rules selected by the ﬁrst
technique, the technique further selects rules (whose deci-
sions are different from the decision of rules covered by
failed tests) as likely faulty rules for inspection. Suppose
that a failed packet covers a rule ri with decision deci, and
a rule rj (j < i) is the faulty rule (including a faulty clause)
with decision decj. After we correct the faulty clause of rj,
the failed packet covers rj. As deci is not the expected deci-
sion for the failed packet, deci and decj should be different;
otherwise, the correction of the faulty clause cannot lead to
the expected decision for the packet.
4.3 Rule Ranking
This section describes a technique to rank rules based on
their likelihood of being faulty by considering clause cov-
erage. The rationale behind the metrics for the rule ranking
techniqueisbasedonthatclausecoverageofafaultyruleby
failed packets often demonstrates some special characteris-
tic; among rules selected by the previous technique, the
number of clauses that are evaluated to false in a faulty rule
is at least equal to or smaller than that in other rules. There-
fore, thetechniquemonitorsclausecoverageandranksrules
for inspection by the order of small ratios of false clauses
over all clauses evaluated by all failed packets.
Assume that rule rj includes a single RFC fault and
a failed test packet k covers rule ri rather than rj (j < i).
When a failed test evaluates rj, a faulty clause c in rj is
evaluated to false by k; however, the remaining clauses in
rj are evaluated to true. In other words, only a single clause
(which is the fault location) in rj is evaluated to false by
k. When k evaluates other rules that are located above ri,
k evaluates at least one clause to false not to match these
rules. Therefore, for rj, the number of false clauses eval-
uated by k could be relatively smaller than the number of
false clauses for other faulty likely rules.
We develop an equation to measure the suspiciousness
of rules, called suspicions based on clause coverage. For
each rule, the suspicion is computed based on the number of
false clauses during evaluation of failed tests divided by the
number of true clauses covered by failed tests. The higher
suspicion on r, a higher likelihood of r to be faulty. Our
technique ranks rules by suspicions in a decreasing order.
For each rule r, let FF(r) (FT(r)) be the number of false
(true) clauses during evaluation of failed tests. For each rule
r, we measure suspicion (r) with the following equation:
suspicion(r) = 1 −
FF(r)
FF(r) + FT(r)
(3)
Figure 3 shows an example faulty policy and its rule re-
duction. Columns 2-3 show the times of each rule covered
by failed and passed tests, respectively. Columns 4-8 show
the times of true and false clauses covered by failed tests,
respectively, and suspicion based on clause coverage (Col-
umn “Susp”), selected rules (for inspection), and each rule’s
rank to decide which rules should be inspected ﬁrst. In Fig-
ure 3, R1 is a faulty rule because we inject an RFC fault by
changing its third clause values from “[3,5]” to “[3,3]”.
In this example, 12 tests are generated: 9 tests are passed
tests and 3 tests are failed tests. In this example, R4 and R5
are covered by failed tests. We ﬁrst inspect the the earliest-Table 1. Real-life policies and faulty policies
with at least one failed test.
Policy # Rules # Tests # RDC # RFC
1 (fw.LAN) 28 140 14 50
2 (fw.MAIL1SLU) 18 90 7 42
3 (fw.MAILHOST) 26 130 16 60
4 (fw.MAILHOST2) 26 130 11 61
5 (fw.MAILHOST3) 27 135 12 63
6 (fw.MAILHOST4) 28 140 22 77
7 (fw.NEWS) 14 70 9 28
8 (fw.NS3) 17 85 9 29
9 (fw.RCPROTO1) 23 115 10 42
10 (fw.SSH) 16 80 6 26
11 (fw.WAN) 24 120 15 42
12 (fw.std4) 42 210 31 58
13 (fw.std-format5) 87 435 86 304
14 (fw.std0) 661 3305 637 3113
Average 74.07 370.36 63.21 285.36
placed rule R4 covered by failed tests and discover that R4
does not contain a fault.
If we cannot locate faults by inspecting R4, we apply the
rule reduction technique in Section 4.2. We consider three
rules R1, R2, R3 located above R4 for inspection; these
rules are given higher priority than R4 during evaluation,
and a fault in one of these rules can affect R4 to introduce
incorrect policy behavior. Among the three rules, we se-
lect R1 and R3 as likely faulty rules because their decisions
(“accept”) are different from R4’s decision (“discard”).
Considering R1 and R3 in Figure 3, suspicion (R1) is
0.66 (1 - 3/9 = 0.66) and suspicion (R3) is 0.44 (1 - 5/9 =
0.44). Therefore, R1 is given a higher rank for inspection
than R3.
5 Evaluation
We conducted our experiments on a laptop PC running
Windows XP SP2 with 1G memory and dual 1.86GHz In-
tel Pentium processor. Experimental subjects include faulty
policies(withtheirfailedandpassedtests)synthesizedfrom
real-life ﬁrewall policies. For each faulty policy and its
failed/passed tests, our tool ﬁrst analyzes rules covered by
failed tests and checks whether the earliest-placed rule in-
clude a fault. If the earliest-placed rule covered by failed
tests does not include a fault, the tool further reduces the
number of rules for inspection based on our proposed rule
reduction techniques. To further reduce effort, our tool
ranks the reduced rules to decide which rules should be in-
spected ﬁrst.
5.1 Subjects
Our experimental subjects include 885 RDC and 3995
RFC faulty policies synthesized from 14 real-life ﬁrewall
policies collected from a variety of sources. Our tool
ﬁrst analyzes a given real-life policy and synthesizes its
faulty policies by seeding a fault on each clause or decision.
We call a faulty policy a mutant and each mutant includes
one seeded fault. The tool generates test packets using the
packet generation technique based on local constraint solv-
ing [3] (for each faulty policy). The tool compares two de-
cisions for a packet: the decision evaluated against a faulty
policy and the decision evaluated against its original policy.
If two decisions are inconsistent (consistent), the tool clas-
siﬁes such a test packet as a failed (passed) test. Among
our generated mutants, we select only faulty policies with
at least one failed test.
Table 1 shows the basic statistics and the number of syn-
thesized faulty policies for each real-life policy. Columns 1-
2 show the policy names and the numbers of rules for each
real-life policy, respectively. Column 3 shows the number
of generated tests. Columns 4-5 show the number of gen-
erated RDC and RFC faulty policies, respectively, with at
least one failed test.
5.2 Objectives and Measures
In the experiments, we intend to answer the following
research questions:
1. Can our covered-rule-fault localization detect a faulty
rule by inspecting the earliest-placed rule covered by
failed tests?
2. Can our rule reduction technique effectively reduce the
number of rules for inspection?
3. Can our rule ranking technique further improve the re-
sults of the rule reduction technique in terms of rule
reduction percentage for inspection?
Intuitively, without effective tool support, testers inspect
all rules. Averagely, if rules are randomly or arbitrarily se-
lected for inspection, half of rules could be inspected until
a faulty rule is detected. Let the number of rules be r. The
number of inspected rules on average is r = r
2. If rules
are ordered by our rule ranking technique for inspection, a
faulty rule’s rank n refers to the number of inspected rules
until the faulty rule is detected. For each mutant and its test
packets, we measure the following metrics:
• Rule reduction percentage. Let the total number of
rules be r and the number of the reduced rules be r′.
Wedeﬁnetherulereductionpercentage, %Reduction,
as follows:
%Reduction = (1 −
r′
r
) × 100 = (1 −
r
′
2
r
2
) × 100
• Ranking-based rule reduction percentage. Let the total
number of rules be r and the rank of a faulty rule be n.￿
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Figure 4. Rule reduction and ranking-based
rule reduction percentages for each synthe-
sized policy group
Wedeﬁnetheranking-basedrulereductionpercentage,
%R-Reduction, as follows:
%R−Reduction = (1 −
n
r
) × 100 = (1 −
n
r
2
) × 100
• Passed-test count. The passed-test count is the aver-
age number of passed packet-decision pairs for poli-
cies synthesized based on a given policy.
• Failed-test count. The failed-packet count is the aver-
age number of of failed packet-decision pairs for poli-
cies synthesized based on a given policy.
5.3 Results
We observed that 100% of RDC faulty rules are cov-
ered by at least one failed test. As failed tests cover an
RDC faulty rule, the rule coverage information (i.e., the
covered rules) is sufﬁcient to locate such faults. To de-
tect such faults, policy testers are required to inspect the
earliest-placed rule among covered rules during evaluation
of failed tests. the earliest-placed rule is suggested by our
covered-rule-fault localization technique. We observed that
69% of RFC faulty rules are covered by at least one failed
test. In such a case, among covered rules by failed tests,
policy testers are required to inspect the earliest-placed rule
suggested by our covered-rule-fault localization technique.
We next present results about faulty rules not being cov-
ered by failed tests. 31% of RFC faulty rules are not cov-
ered by only failed tests. Table 2 shows the basic statis-
tics of such faulty policies used in our experiments and
their rule reduction percentage on average by our pro-
posed techniques: rule reduction and rule ranking tech-
niques. Columns 1-2 show the policy names and the num-
ber of generated RFC faulty policies for each real-life pol-
icy. Columns 3-4 show the average number of passed and
failed tests, respectively, generated based on each real-life
policy. Columns 5-6 show the average percentage of rule
reduction for each real-life policy by our rule reduction and
ranking techniques, respectively. Figure 4 illustrates rule
reduction percentage comparison of these two techniques
for the faulty policies shown in Table 2. The x axis shows
the indexes of the policy names for faulty policies and the y
axis shows the average rule reduction percentage.
In Table 2, we observed that there is a correlation be-
tween the structure of a ﬁrewall policy and its rule reduc-
tion percentage. One example is the fw.std0 policy. The
policy consists of 661 rules; 660 rules are speciﬁed to ac-
cept some packets and 1 remaining rule is a tautology rule
to discard all other packets. As types of decisions are too
imbalanced in this policy, the rule reduction technique can-
not reduce rules based on selecting rules including different
decisions from that of its earliest-placed rule. For the pol-
icy, we observed that 0% of rules are reduced for inspection.
However, the rule ranking technique is not affected by such
imbalanced decisions in the policy. We observed that this
policy achieves the highest reduction percentage, 95.72%
considering clause coverage.
We also observed that 30.63% of rules on average are
reduced for inspection (Column “% Reduction”). Our tech-
nique is effective to reduce 30.63% of rules required for
inspection. Such a reduced number of rules help policy
testers to reduce their inspection efforts. Based on our rank-
ing technique, we observed that 56.53% of rules on average
are reduced for inspection (Column “% R-Reduction”). The
ranking further achieves around 26% reduction for rule in-
spection in comparison with the results of the rule reduc-
tion. Overall, our ranking further improves the rule reduc-
tion technique.
6 Related Work
Various techniques have been proposed on fault local-
ization of software programs in software engineering and
programming language communities [1,2,4]. These tech-
niques aim to help a developer ﬁnd faulty code locations in
a program quickly. These techniques are based on dynamic
program slicing [1], the nearest neighbor technique [9], and
statistical techniques [4]. These preceding techniques typ-
ically analyze the likely faulty locations based on dynamic
information collected from running the faulty program. Par-
ticularly, statistical techniques use data collected from fail-
ing and successful runs of a program to ﬁnd likely faulty
locations. Firewall polices and general programs are fun-
damentally different in terms of structures, semantics, and
functionalities, etc. Therefore, fault localization techniques
of general programs are not suitable for addressing the fault
localization problem of ﬁrewall policies.
Prior work that is closest to ours is Marmorstein et al.’s
work [8]. They proposed a technique to ﬁnd failing pack-
ets that violate the requirement speciﬁcation of a ﬁrewall
policy, and presented another technique to further use the
failing packets and the history map of ﬁrewall rules to eas-
ily identify two or three faulty rules in a ﬁrewall policy. Our
proposed techniques have three main advantages over theirTable 2. Faulty policies (including an RFC faulty rule un-covered by its failed tests) used in the ex-
periment.
Policy # RFC # Avg-Passed # Avg-Failed % Reduction % R-Reduction
1 (fw.LAN) 18 136.11 3.89 7.14 64.68
2 (fw.MAIL1SLU) 12 85.25 4.75 44.91 64.81
3 (fw.MAILHOST) 17 128.06 1.94 15.38 35.97
4 (fw.MAILHOST2) 17 126.18 3.82 34.39 60.86
5 (fw.MAILHOST3) 17 131.24 3.76 33.99 59.48
6 (fw.MAILHOST4) 30 138.07 1.93 26.90 54.17
7 (fw.NEWS) 9 68.44 1.56 28.57 33.33
8 (fw.NS3) 5 84.00 1.00 23.53 40.00
9 (fw.RCPROTO1) 8 113.50 1.50 51.09 68.48
10 (fw.SSH) 3 78.33 1.67 25.00 39.58
11 (fw.WAN) 20 117.80 2.20 31.46 35.83
12 (fw.std4) 16 209.00 1.00 77.08 85.86
13 (fw.std-format5) 176 432.68 2.32 29.43 52.59
14 (fw.std0) 738 3303.95 1.05 0.00 95.72
Average 77.57 368.04 2.31 30.63 56.53
work. First, their work misses all the potential faulty rules
that we handled in the RFC fault category because they con-
sider only the rules that match a failed packet whereas we
examine the rules above the rule that failed packets match.
Second, we reduced the number of possible faulty rules,
while their work can only ﬁnd out all the potential faulty
rules that cover the failed packets. Third, we ranked the po-
tential faulty rules to facilitate searching of the faulty rule,
while their work did not rank rules.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have developed a fault localization approach for a
ﬁrewall policy where a Rule Decision Change (RDC) or
Rule Field interval Change (RFC) fault exists. Our empiri-
cal results showed that 100% of RDC faulty rules and 69%
of RFC faulty rules can be detected by inspecting covered
rules. However, 31% of RFC faulty rules are not covered by
only failed test. We further applied our reduction and rank-
ing techniques on such faulty policies. Our empirical results
showed 30.63% of rules on average are reduced for inspec-
tion based on our rule reduction technique and 56.53% of
rules on average are reduced for inspection based on our
rule ranking.
Our approach has been shown to be practically effective
to locate a single fault in a ﬁrewall policy. However, faults
in a policy may consist of one or several simple faults. We
plan to extend our approach to handle a policy containing
multiple faults in future work.
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